This paper compares the importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries. Overall, empirical results support precautionary motives; in particular, a more liberal capital account regime increases international reserves. Theoretically, large precautionary demand for international reserves arises as a self-insurance to avoid costly liquidation of long-term projects when the economy is susceptible to sudden stops. The welfare gain from the optimal management of international reserves is of a first-order magnitude, reducing the welfare cost of liquidity shocks from a first-order to a second-order magnitude. 
Introduction and summary
This paper has two goals: quantifying the relative importance of alternative views explaining international reserves accumulation, and modeling precautionary demand for international reserves, viewing it as self-insurance against costly output contractions induced by sudden stops and capital flight. This model is used to provide welfare evaluation of the costs and benefits of hoarding reserves, and the optimal size of precautionary demand.
The 1997-8 crisis in East Asia led to profound changes in the demand for international reserves, increasing over time the hoarding by affected countries. Several salient features of the 1997-8 crisis may provide clues to the changing attitude towards international reserves. First, the magnitude and speed of the reversal of capital flows throughout the 1997-8 crisis surprised most observers. While the 1994 Tequila crisis induced the market to expect similar crises in Latin America, most viewed East Asian countries as being less vulnerable to the perils associated with "hot money." 1 This presumption followed from the prevalent pre-1997 view --East Asian
countries were more open to international trade, had sounder overall fiscal policies, and had stronger growth performance than Latin American countries. In retrospect, the crisis exposed hidden vulnerabilities of East Asian countries, forcing the market to update the probability of sudden stops affecting all countries. The crisis also led to sharp output and investment contractions, credit crunches, and-in several countries-to full-blown banking crises. 2 Finally, most affected countries went through tough adjustments, reversing the output contraction and resuming growth within several years. While a few countries flirted with capital controls, within two to three years most countries retained or increased their financial integration.
The above observations suggest that hoarding international reserves can be viewed as a precautionary adjustment, reflecting the desire for self-insurance against exposure to future sudden stops. This view, however, faces a well-known contender in a modern incarnation of mercantilism: international reserves accumulations triggered by concerns about export competitiveness. This explanation has been advanced by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) , especially in the context of China. They interpret reserves accumulation as a by-product of promoting exports, which is needed to create better jobs, thereby absorbing abundant labor in traditional sectors, mostly in agriculture. Under this strategy, reserves accumulation may facilitate export growth by preventing or slowing appreciation. Some view the modern mercantilist approach as a valid interpretation for most East Asian countries, arguing that they follow similar development strategies. This interpretation is intellectually intriguing, especially in the broader context of the "Revived Bretton Woods system," yet it remains debatable. Some have pointed out that high export growth is not the new kid on the block --it is the story of EastAsia during the last fifty years. Yet, the large increase in hoarding reserves has happened mostly after 1997. This issue is of more than academic importance: the precautionary approach links reserves accumulation directly to exposure to sudden stops, capital flight and volatility, whereas the mercantilist approach views reserves accumulation as a residual of an industrial policy, a policy that may impose negative externalities on other trading partners.
Figure 1 suggests that the past decade provided a ripe environment for precautionary motive to intensify. The upper panel shows the average ratios of reserves to GDP (in percent), calculated for 28 emerging-market economies and for 23 advanced economies (the lists in the appendix). From the early or mid-1990s, the average reserve ratio of emerging markets took a visibly different path from that of advanced economies. Being the simple average of the ratios for each country, this reflects the sharp rise in the ratios in most countries, and not the developments restricted to a handful of large emerging markets. The lower panel shows the 2 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Hutchison and Noy (2002) for further discussion on the output costs associated with sudden stops.
index of capital account liberalization (Edwards, 2005) , aggregated for the two country groups and normalized to their 1980 values. The index rose for both country groups, but rose much more sharply for the emerging-market group, roughly coinciding with the pickup in the reserve-to-GDP ratio of emerging markets. 3 While not constituting sufficient evidence on its own, this comparison suggests that financial market developments-entailing stronger precautionary motive-may have been a critical factor behind the reserve accumulation since the early 1990s.
- This result applies to all countries, including China. Indeed, inspecting the magnitude of country-specific dummies reveals that China is not an outlier in the level of reserves.
Overall, the empirical results of Section 2 are in line with the precautionary demand.
Yet, the precautionary demand approach has not been endorsed uniformly. Skeptical views point out that the sheer magnitude of reserves accumulated by East Asian countries seems excessive once attention is paid to the opportunity costs of reserves. In order to deal with these concerns, we provide in Section 3 a simple model characterizing and quantifying the welfare gains attributed to hoarding reserves in the presence of exposure to external liquidity shocks. The model extends the literature dealing with the demand for bank reserves in the closed economy to the important, yet less studied open-economy context. 4 Specifically, we consider a country exposed to international liquidity shocks, which in turn can cause liquidation and consolidation of investment. A key postulate of the analysis is that, short of having a credible international lender of last resort, hoarding international reserves is among the few options allowing developing countries to reduce the output costs of sudden stops. While hoarding international reserves has its opportunity cost, we identify circumstances where the welfare gain from hoarding reserves is of a first-order magnitude, leading to potentially large precautionary demand for reserves.
The earlier literature focused on using international reserves as part of the management of an adjustable-peg or managed-floating exchange rate regime [Frenkel (1983) , Edwards (1983) ; see Flood and Marion (2001) In this framework, deposits and reserves are complements -higher volatility of liquidity shocks will increase both the demand for reserves and deposits. The optimal hoarding of reserves to accommodate more volatile liquidity shocks reduces the output cost of these shocks from firstorder to second-order magnitude. 5 The precautionary demand modeled in this paper supplements the precautionary demand stemming from fiscal considerations. For example, one may argue that the prospect of unification of North and South Korea [or a conflict in the worst-case scenario] may explain part of the hoarding of international reserves by Korea. Yet, we may qualify this argument by noting that one expects the US and the OECD countries to provide the credit needed to finance the unification (or the conflict). This argument, however, does not extend to the case of a sudden stop and capital flight.
As the 1997 crisis illustrated, external finance at times of sudden stops is not forthcoming without stringent conditions and is frequently limited due to moral hazard considerations. 6 The recent history of Argentina provided a vivid illustration of the limited ability to diversify away liquidity shocks. In the mid-1990s Argentina negotiated contingent commercial credit lines in an attempt to provide external insurance against liquidity shocks. These lines, however, dried up as Argentina approached the crisis.
International Reserves: Evidence
The mercantilist view focuses on hoarding international reserves in order to prevent or mitigate appreciation, with the ultimate goal of increasing export growth. Hence, we expect that reserves hoarding provoked by mercantilist concerns should be associated with higher export growth rate, and with a depreciated real exchange rate relative to the fundamental PPP real exchange rate. In order to control for export growth, we constructed a three-year moving average of the growth rate of real exports (called EX Growth in tables), lagged two years in the regression. We used lags to avoid contemporaneous endogeneity, but also present the result of using the contemporaneous value of this variable.
Our "fundamental" PPP real exchange rate is defined as the fitted value from the regression of national price levels on the relative income-the PPP-based real per-capita income relative to the United States. Our choice is motivated by the classic Penn effect, ascertained on numerous occasions for the post-war era. 7 For our sample, the effect is confirmed in the estimates reported in Table 1 , which included year-specific constants to address the fact that national price levels are constructed for comparison across space rather than across time. The deviations from the "fundamental" PPP value (PL Deviation) are measured by the residuals of this regression. 8 If a country accumulates reserves to achieve a depreciated real exchange rate relative to the fundamental PPP value, a negative correlation will emerge between the reserves and PL Deviation. In contrast, a positive correlation will arise if a country with an overappreciated exchange rate tends to accumulate international reserves in an effort to slow the pace of appreciation. The actual correlation will be determined by the prevailing tendency among countries in the sample.
The next set of variables attempts to capture the developments with external financial markets. The degree of capital account liberalization is captured by the variable (K Account)
constructed by Edwards (2005) , which measures the degree of liberalization in a finer grid than 7 See Kravis (1984) for a classic reference on PPP, and Samuelson (1994) for the apt expression "Penn effect." 8 We regard this as a robust measure of exchange rate misalignment, rather than the best or complete measure which hardly exists. Frenkel (2006) markets. In addition, we control for the log of population (Population); log of percent import share (Openness); exchange rate volatility (ER Volatility); and the log of the terms of trade index(ToT). The estimating equation, which allows for country-specific constants, is summarized as follows:
We refer readers to the appendix for detailed description of data, and only discuss the choice of sample countries and sample period here. We selected 53 countries with decent data availability, encompassing traditional advanced economies, emerging markets, and several large developing countries. The latter two groups were combined into one group which we call emerging markets for convenience in the rest of the paper. Hong Kong and Singapore were excluded from most regressions. For the sample period, Hong Kong often had reserves exceeding 40 percent of its GDP and maintained a currency board system for many years, and Before turning to the regression results, the objective of our empirical strategy may need clarification. We do not claim that our specification can definitively uncover the causality that underlay the accumulation of international reserves over the past two decade for the sample of countries which went through very diverse experiences in terms of economic growth, structural transformation, and policy reform. Rather, we turn to the data looking for relatively robust correlations that guide our thinking, which emerge clearly by the end of this section.
The representative regressions are presented in in Latin America and Asia, respectively, while remaining equal to 0 for emerging markets outside Asia and Latin America as well as for all advanced economies.
Columns II and V show that crisis variables are statistically significant whether for the whole sample or the subsample of emerging markets. However, when crisis dummies are broken down for Asia and Latin America (columns III and VI), it is clear that the Asian crisis had a disproportionately large effect on Asian emerging markets. In contrast, the Mexican crisis does not appear to have had a statistically strong effect on emerging markets in the two regions, implying that it had a stronger effect on emerging markets outside these two regions (Russia, for example), when compared with the statistically significant coefficient in columns II and V.
Population and openness have statistically significant positive coefficients, while the price level deviation has a significant negative coefficient. The negative coefficient of the price level deviation lends support to the interpretation that countries accumulate international reserves 10 The results of regressions for post-1975 sample are available from the authors upon request. Main results remain identical, despite limited data availability.
to keep the exchange rate depreciated. The coefficient of export growth is statistically significant in all cases for the subsample of emerging markets, while for the whole sample, it is statistically significant only when Asia-specific crisis dummy is used.
The terms of trade are statistically significant with the expected sign for the whole sample, but not for the subsample that excludes advanced economies. The coefficient on the terms of trade declines both in numerical magnitude and in statistical significance when advanced countries are excluded from the sample, suggesting that the terms of trade fluctuations are partly absorbed through reserves in advanced economies but not in emerging-market economies. The exchange rate volatility is statistically significant only when Asia-specific crisis dummy is used, whether for the whole sample or for the subsample.
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Strikingly consistent result is found for capital account liberalization. In all six columns-and in other cases not reproduced in the paper-the coefficient on capital account liberalization is positive and statistically significant. Combined with the statistically significant coefficients on crisis dummies, this implies that capital market developments are a robust factor behind the recent build-up in international reserves, if not the single most important factor. Table 3 reports several variations intended to check robustness. Columns I and IV reports a regression that directly includes the relative per-capita income and national price level. These are conceptually equivalent to columns II and V of Table 2 , and confirm that the relative income affects reserves largely via national price levels, when combined with the fact that the relative income is not statistically significant when included together with the price level deviation (results not reproduced here but available upon request).
Columns II and V in Table 3 use the contemporaneous value of export growth variable, in case our use of two-lagged variable understates the strength of this channel. In comparison to contrary, the capital account liberalization index and the terms of trade are found to strengthen the coefficients of export growth and price level deviation. Tables 2 and 3) to 0.9, reflecting the fact that Hong Kong and Singapore are prominent outliers in their reserves-to-GDP ratios. Otherwise, the basic patterns in Tables 2 and 3 -
The comparison among Tables 2, 3 and 4 shows that the results in Table 2 do not systematically understate the strength of mercantilist channel, at least not by including our controls associated with external financial-market developments (capital account liberalization index, in particular). We will thus use the results of Table 2 (column II) to assess the likely magnitude of various channels in explaining the recent accumulation of reserves in several emerging markets. Other variables are presented in terms of their contribution to the change in this ratio of reserves to GDP since 1990, calculated by multiplying the coefficient estimates of column II of Table 2 and the changes of each corresponding regressor since 1990. For ease of discussion and presentation, the contributions are grouped into four categories. The mercantilist factor comprises the effects of export growth and price level deviation. The precautionary factor comprises the effects of capital account liberalization and two crisis dummies. The external factor comprises the effects of the exchange rate volatility, terms of trade, and openness, while the domestic factor captures the effect of population growth. In all four countries, the most conspicuous factor for reserve accumulation is the precautionary factor, while the mercantilist and external factors played some roles. To consider China and Korea, the external factor appears to have played a bigger role than the mercantilist factor in China, while the opposite applies to
Korea. Figure 4 plots the distribution of the country specific effects (column II of Table 2 ), in terms of the deviation of country-specific constants from the average across all countries. Again, the top panel is based on column II of Table 2 and the bottom panel on column VI. Note that China's country specific effect is a large negative, implying that China's apparently large reserves do not make it an outlier in the context of the cross country panel comparison over the 1980-2000 period. One such country is Cyprus, which has a country specific effect close to two standard deviations above the average. 13 Considering the magnitude of negative country-specific coefficient for China, reserve accumulation of additional 15 percentage points of GDP-which is 12 Unlike other variables, the terms of trade is a time-series index whose value is based on a particular base year (1995 in our data). Hence, the cross-country dispersion in it captures the cross-country dispersion in changes of the terms of trade relative to the base year. 13 In regressions of what happened since 2000-would still keep China's reserves at a level fully consistent with the reserve-accumulation patterns of our sample countries.
------------------------FIGURE 4 ------------------------
To take stock of the results from the viewpoint of a horse race between the mercantilist and precautionary views of international reserves, the precautionary motive played a more visible role in the accumulation of reserves than the mercantilist motive. Variables associated with the precautionary motive were statistically significant across a broad spectrum of specifications, while variables associated with the mercantilist motive often lost statistical significance. The quantitative magnitude of the combination of all mercantilist variables was also comparable to the quantitative magnitude of one of several precautionary variables. At the very minimum, we could identify the likely effect of precautionary motive more easily and strongly than the likely effect of mercantilist motive.
The model
We construct a minimal model to explain the self insurance offered by international reserves in mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks. The structure of the model is akin to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) --investment in a long term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks. 14 Hence, the liquidity shock may force costly liquidation of the earlier investment, reducing second period output. As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that all financial intermediation is done by banks, relying on a debt contract. We simplify further by assuming that there is no separation between the bank and the entrepreneurthe entrepreneur is the bank owner, using it to finance the investment. The time line is summarized in Figure 5 .
------------------------FIGURE 5 ------------------------
14 Our model follows the tradition of Bryant (1980) or Diamond and Dybvig (1993) in that the source of liquidity shock lies with the lender, rather than the borrower (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) . However, our model assumes away the market equilibrium among lenders (be it the risk of runs or the difficulty of the decentralized provision of liquidity). Abstracting from the question whether market-based liquidity insurance is available, we focus on the implication of large adjustment cost-including but not restricted to the liquidation cost-on the demand for reserves as self-insurance. In a similar vein, no distinction is made between the private sector and the monetary authorities which maintain the stock of international reserves.
At the beginning of period 1, risk neutral agents deposit D in banks, which in turn use D to finance long term investment, 1 K , and hoarding reserves, R. A liquidity shock, with the aggregate value of Z for the borrowing economy, materializes at the end of period 1, after the commitment of capital. A liquidity shock exceeding reserves induces a pre-mature liquidation of Z -R. Output increases with the capital invested at the beginning of period one, 1 K , and declines with liquidation at a rate that depends on the adjustment cost, θ. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the second period output is
; where 1 0 < ≤ θ , and 1 < α .
Recalling that
, the net capital after liquidation is:
It is convenient to normalize the liquidity shock by the level of deposits, denoting the normalized shock by z:
, and density ) (z f .
Depositors are entitled to a real return of D r on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of investment.
15 Assuming agents' subjective discount rate is ρ , competitive intermediation implies that
. 15 The possibility that the outcome of investment is not large enough to meet the promised rate of return is discussed later. To preview, this possibility does not affect the main conclusion of our analysis, because of the assumption of risk neutrality. 
It is the sum of the expected output, plus the income associated with reserves net of liquidation, minus the repayment to depositors who get a return of ρ on the net deposit position,
Applying (3) and the definition of the z*, we re-write the expected surplus as
The FOC determining the optimal demand for international reserves is, using the envelope theorem,
This condition is equivalent to:
MP is the marginal productivity of capital, and ] Pr[ R Z < is the probability that the liquidity shock is below the level of reserves. The expected opportunity cost of holding reserves is equalized to the expected precautionary benefit of holding reserves. reserves is depicted in Figure 6 by the shaded area below the old production curve, for z < z*.
------------------------FIGURE 6 ------------------------
Similarly, the increase in output associated with the extra dollar reserves correspond to the shaded area to the right of the old production curve, for z > z*. The expected net gain in production from holding reserves corresponds to the difference between the two shaded areas,
properly weighted by f(z), as well as the expected gross income attributed to extra dollar reserves. Optimal reserves, which satisfy equation (7), maximize the overall expected gain.
The first order condition characterizing optimal deposit can be rewritten as: 
Applying (8') to (9), the first order approximation of the expected surplus can be reduced to
Liquidity shocks have a first order adverse effect on expected surplus. In the absence of the insurance provided by reserves, liquidation induces a deadweight loss equal to the adjustment cost, θ, times the expected liquidation. This result is not affected if we allow the optimal adjustment of deposits: the envelope theorem implies that such an adjustment would have only second order effects.
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In a two states of nature case, perfect stabilization can be achieved by hoarding reserves equal to the liquidity shock:
; adjusting deposits to 
17 With more than two states of nature, R would be preset at the ex-ante efficient level, providing full insurance for liquidity shocks below z*, and partial insurance above. While there is no way to insure complete stabilization, one expects large welfare gain from setting R at the ex-ante efficient level relative to the case of R = 0. deposit is kept at the level of equation (8'). The reserves ratio increases with the volatility.
Allowing for the optimal adjustment of D according to equation (8), it follows that
. The increase in D is needed to mitigate the costly drop in output induced by reserves accumulation, and is needed to keep the planned capital at the optimal level. Table 5 traces the impact of higher volatility for the case where both reserves and deposits are adjusting optimally, contrasting it to the case where reserves are set to zero [the last two columns]. Specifically, the first four columns report the optimal reserves/deposit ratio, deposits, reserves and expected surplus as a function of volatility, assuming that R and D are adjusted optimally. The last two columns report D and expected surplus for case where R is zero, and only D is adjusted optimally.
In the absence of reserves, the volatility has first order effects on output: increasing volatility from zero to 0.6 reduces expected surplus by about 15%. Hoarding the optimal level of reserves reduces the cost of volatility into a second order magnitude, about 3%. Hence, optimal reserves have a first order welfare effect, increasing the expected surplus by about 12% relative to the case of zero reserves. Accomplishing this gain requires relatively large reserves, about half of the deposit level for the case where 6 . 0 = λ . The effect of volatility with optimal reserves hoarding is to increase both deposits and reserves, while keeping the level of planned capital 1 K almost constant.
Our discussion assumed so far that the limited liability constraint does not bind: that is,
Indeed, it can be verified that the limited liability constraint is not binding in the simulation reported in Table 5 . We now show that our main results are not dependent on these parametric Note that (13) is identical to the expected surplus in the base case of the previous section, (5').
With risk neutral agents, binding limited liability constraint changes the deposit interest rate, without changing the entrepreneur's expected surplus and investment patterns. 
Concluding remarks
Our study has outlined a procedure that helps to identify the contributions of precautionary and mercantilist motives to the hoarding of international reserves. Applying it to 1980-2000, we found that variables associated with trade openness and exposure to financial crises are both statistically and economically important in explaining reserves. In contrast, variables associated with mercantilist concerns are statistically significant, but economically insignificant in accounting for the patterns of hoarding reserves. These results hold for most countries, including China. We provided a model that
shows that precautionary demand is consistent with high levels of reserves. We close the paper with qualifying remarks. As is the case with all empirical studies, more accurate and updated data may modify the results. Our empirical study does not imply that the hoarding of reserves by countries is optimal or efficient. Making inferences regarding efficiency would require having a detailed model and much more information, including an assessment of the probability and output costs of sudden stops, and the opportunity cost of reserves. Our study reveals, however, that existing patterns of growing trade openness and greater exposure to financial shocks by emerging markets go a long way towards accounting for the observed hoarding of international reserves. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 all include country-specific constant terms. The primary sample for Table 2 comprises 49 countries that include advanced and emerging-market economies as well as several major developing economies. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Cyprus, Israel, Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Algeria, China, Croatia, Egypt, India, and Morocco. Four countries were not included in the above sample of 49 countries for varying reasons. Luxembourg and Taiwan Province of China were excluded owing to the absence of capital account liberalization indexes. They were included in Table 3 , and the first column of Table 1 . Hong Kong SAR and Singapore were excluded because their reserves exceeded 40 and 80 percent of GDP in many sample years, respectively, constituting outliers that spuriously improve the fit of the regressions. They were included in Table 4 and the second column of Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Statistically significant at 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*). Statistically significant at 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All regressions included country fixed effects. A d j . R s q u a r e d 0 . 7 2 0 . 7 2 0 . 7 3 0 . 7 2 0 . 7 2 0 . 7 2 C r o s s -s e c t i o n 4 9 4 9 5 1 2 7 2 7 2 8
Data Appendix: Definitions of the regression variables
Statistically significant at 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All regressions included country fixed effects. Statistically significant at 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All regressions included country fixed effects. 
